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FROM FACTS TO FORM: 
EXTENSION AND APPLICATION 
OF THE FEIST "PRACTICAL 
INEVITABILITY" TEST AND 
CREATIVITY STANDARD 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Note will analyze the results of extending the "practi-
cal inevitability" test and creativity standard in the holding of 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. 1 from 
works involving the compilation of facts to other works includ-
ing computer programs, sculpture, signs, fabric patterns and 
chinaware patterns. It will also discuss the Copyright Office's 
review of copyright applications for functional objects. The 
Note will continue with an analysis of the ramifications of 
the policy of judicial deference to the Register of Copyright's 
decision on creativity when reviewing a copyright denial. It will 
conclude with a discussion of the judicial policy that an action 
for infringement is the most appropriate place to determine the 
creativity element necessary for obtaining a copyright for 
functional objects. 
II. THE BASIS OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTIONS 
The right of an author under the common law to have the 
sole right of initial printing and publishing of his or her work 
was decided in England by Lord· Mansfield writing for the 
majority in Millar v. Taylor. 2 
In the United States, constitutional copyright protection 
subsists in originai works of authorship.3 The two require-
ments for authorship, independent creation and creativity, 
arise from the statutory phrase "original works of author-
ship" which in turn has its basis in the Constitution.4 In order 
1. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Servo Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991). 
2. 1588-1774 Eng. Rep. 119 (1769), quoted in Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 
937 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir. 1991). 
3. U.S. CONST. art I, §.8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). 
4. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8; 17 U.S.C. § 102. See also Feist, 111 S. Ct. 1282; 
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to be certified as a pictorial, graphic or sculptural work appro-
priate for copyright protection, the work must incorporate 
some creative authorship in its delineation or form. 6 
III. THE "PRACTICAL INEVITABILITY" TEST AND 
CREATIVITY STANDARD OF FEIST 
The Supreme Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service CO.6 addressed the constitutional origins of 
copyright and determined a standard of creativity to be applied 
to all works. Although the Court could have restricted its 
holding to the white pages telephone directory which was the 
subject of the dispute, the Court used the opportunity for a thor-
ough discussion of the requirement of creativity in copyrighted 
works. 
The issue in Feist was whether the white pages listings in 
a telephone directory, which compiled an alphabetical listing 
of the names of telephone subscribers together with their 
addresses and telephone numbers, had the requisite creativ-
ity to be afforded copyright protection.7 The Court held that a 
work is "original" and qualifies for copyright protection if the 
work is independently created by the author and possesses 
some minimal degree of creativity.s Originality for copyright 
purposes is constitutionally mandated for all works.9 
The Supreme Court held that the vast majority of works 
"make the grade. "10 The requisite level is extremely low, even 
a slight amount will suffice. ll However, "originality" does not 
require "novelty;" a work may be original even though it is very 
similar to other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, 
not the result of copying. 12 
5. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(a) (1991). 
6. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991). 
7. [d. at 1282. Rural Telephone Service was a public utility providing service 
to communities in Kansas. Rural was required by Kansas regulations to compile a direc-
tory including white and yellow pages. The information was obtained from sub-
scribers when they obtained service. Feist Publications, Inc. was a publishing 
company that specialized in area wide telephone directories. When Rural refused to 
license its white pages listings to Feist, the information was extracted without con-
sent. Although Feist altered many of Rural's listings, several were identical to list-
ings in Rural's directory. The district court granted summary judgment to Rural in 
an infringement suit, which was affirmed on appeal. [d. at 1286. 
8. [d. at 1287. 
9. [d. at 1288. 
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Prior to Feist the level of creativity necessary for a show-
ing of copyrightability had been described as "very slight," 
"minimal"13 or "modest."14 The Court in Feist held creativity is 
the fundamental copyright principle that mandates the law's 
seemingly different treatment of facts and factual compil-
ations. 16 No one may claim originality as to facts because facts 
do not owe their origin to authorship. IS 
Copyright secures authors the right to their original expres-
sion, but stimulates others to create freely upon the ideas and 
information conveyed by prior works. 17 Under the "sweat of the 
brow theory" copyright was a compensation for the difficult work 
that compiling facts required. IS In Feist the Supreme Court 
rejected the "sweat of the brow" doctrine because it contra-
dicted basic copyright law principles of "originality" and pro-
tection for expressions of facts, not facts themselves. 19 
"Originality" and not "sweat of the brow" is the standard of 
copyright protection in fact based works such as telephone 
directories. 20 Even the choice and organization of facts cannot 
be so mechanical or habitual as to require no creativity whatso-
ever. 21 The white pages listings in Feist's telephone directory 
were entirely typica1.22 The Court described the directory as a 
"garden-variety white pages directory, devoid of even the 
slightest trace of creativity. "23 However, the penultimate rea-
son for denial was that the Court found the alphabetical 
arrangement of the telephone directory not only unoriginal, it 
was practically ineuitable. 24 . 
A person picking up the white pages to find a telephone 
number would not only expect but demand that the listings be 
13. West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219, 1223 (8th Cir. 
1986). 
14. Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 977 (1971). 
15. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1288. 
16. [d. 
17. [d. at 1290 (citing with approval Harper & Row Publishers v. National 
Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 555·57 (1985)). 
18. [d. 
19. [d. 
20. [d. at 1295. 
21. [d. at 1296. 
22. [d. 
23. [d. 
24. [d. at 1297. 
3
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in alphabetical order. To list them otherwise would be non-
functional. The only use for the white pages directory is to 
obtain the telephone numbers of known persons. While other 
compilations of telephone numbers might be helpful, infor-
mational or even entertaining, the practical reason behind 
the white pages listings in a phone book is to quickly and effi-
ciently provide telephone numbers ordered by subscriber's 
name. To achieve this purpose only an alphabetical listing 
works. A non-alphabetical listing system for names would 
be time consuming and therefore costly to use. Practical con-
siderations dictate its arrangement. 
The Court found that there was no practical alternative to 
the arrangement of the uncopyrightable facts in Feist's white 
pages directory. Any copyrightable selection or arrangement 
having creative expression had necessarily been forced to suc-
cumb to the practical alphabetical arrangement, and could 
not exist. 
The fundamental objective of copyright protection is not to 
reward the toil of authors but to promote progress through sci-
ence and the useful arts. 26 Augmenting on and expanding 
through access to the ideas and information of others is 
encouraged.26 
In a rapidly developing technological society unfettered 
access to all ideas is essential. Copyright protection is func-
tional, not privileging. The benefit flows to society, not indi-
viduals. Copyright forces the improvement and creation of 
expressions of ideas to cultivate useful arts as well as goods and 
serVIces. 
This societal benefit is achieved by refusing unlimited 
copying of old expressions of ideas. The practical aspects of any 
work, including its facts or ideas, are not protected by copyright. 
This results in a "practical inevitability" test. If the expression 
is dictated by functional or practical concerns it is not copy-
rightable. 
The Feist Court did not make new law but instead re-
affirmed basic copyright principles with the "practical 
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Accord, Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975), quoted in Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290. 
26. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1290. 
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inevitability" test. The test can be ~pplied to any copyright sit-
uation and guarantees unlimited access to the practical ideas 
and information that a free enterprise society needs. It also 
promotes change and growth by restricting copying of original 
expressions of ideas and stimulating innovative expansion on 
creative thought processes. For authors to achieve copyright 
protection they must find different creative expressions of 
information and ideas. New is not the same as creative. 
IV. RECENT JUDICIAL EXTENSION OF THE FEIST 
"PRACTICAL INEVITABILITY" TEST TO OTHER TYPES 
OF WORKS 
As stated previously, prior to Feist the level of creativity nec-
essary for a copyright had been described as more than some, 
but not very much.27 Because all works are in part non-copy-
rightable, (the idea of "book" is not copyrightable although the 
book is), the standard after Feist is that a work must be devoid 
of even the slightest trace of creativity.28 To be copyrighted a 
work must have creative selectivity, arrangement, or non-
functional elements not dictated by "practical inevitability." It 
is only when form completely follows function that copyright 
cannot be permitted. Functions and facts lack "creativity." 
The Feist Court did not limit the general rule it was pur-
porting to lay down to compilations but instead reiterated the 
basic standard for originality.29 The method of measuring for 
originality may vary but the standard remains the same for 
every work of authorship.30 The Feist standard of originality 
has now been extended beyond compilations to fabric pat-
terns, sculptures, computer programs and chinaware design. 
In Allen-Myland v. International Business Machines, an 
action for copyright infringement of a computer program, the 
Feist creativity standard and the "practical inevitability" test 
were applied.3! The district court on reconsideration held that 
27. See, e.g., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., 799 F.2d 1219, 1223 (8th 
Cir. 1986); Thomas Wilson & Co. v. Irving J. Dorfman Co., 433 F.2d 409, 411 (2d Cir. 
1970). 
28. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1297. 
29. Allen-Myland v. International Business Mach., 770 F. Supp. 1004, 1007 
(E.D. Pa. 1991). 
30. [d. at 1008. 
31. [d. at 1004-06. Allen-Myland had asked for reconsideration of the district 
court's earlier decision in Allen-Myland v. International Business Mach., 746 F. 
Supp. 520 (E.D. Pa. 1990), in light of the Feist decision. In the first decision the court 
5
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Feist did not disprove specifically of decisions requiring the orig-
inality of a multi-element work to be considered as a whole, 
especially when the elements are designed to work together. 32 
The district court also held that Allen-Myland copied infor-
mation which was original to IBM programmers and the 
computer program was not a factual compilation.33 Mter find-
ing that the method for measuring originality for a factual 
compilation would not apply to the contents of the computer 
program, the district court held that the standard for originality 
in Feist was mandatory as the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
basic copyright law on the meaning of the term.34 The district 
court was free to look for originality anywhere on the computer 
tape, not just in its arrangement, selection or coordination.35 
Allen-Myland contended that the computer program, 
described as a microcode, lacked originality in part because the 
contents of portions of the program were created after the 
rest of the microcode. If true, this later material would be 
necessarily dictated by the programming choices IBM had 
already made.56 This would prevent copyright of this later 
material under the "practical inevitability" test of Feist. The 
district court did not agree with Allen-Myland and based its 
holding on the evidence presented. The court discredited 
Allen-Myland's supporting testimony and held that the IBM 
research team did not develop the microcode in pieces but as 
one design activity altogetherY The court also held that IBM's 
choice among many possibilities of table structure, instruction 
arrangement and other information were protected expres-
sion under Feist. 58 
The Feist "practical inevitability" test and creativity stan-
dard were applied to a fabric pattern in Folio Impressions v. 
Byer California.59 The appellate court first determined that the 
held Allen-Myland liable for infringing IBM's copyright in its 3090 microcode. In reach-
ing its conclusion, the court did not analyze the contents of the tape containing the 
infringed materials in isolation from the rest of the microcode. 1d. 
32. AUen-Myland v. International Business Mach., 770 F. Supp. 1004, 1008 




36. 1d. at 1011. 
37.1d. 
38. 1d. at 1012. 
39. 937 F.2d 759 (2d Cir. 1991). Folio Impressions Inc. (Folio) imported and sold 
fabric to women's clothing manufacturers including a rose design which it later 
registered with the Copyright Office. Byer California thereafter obtained a swatch of 
6
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pictorial representation of a rose was copyrighted.40 Then the 
court held that the background on which the copyrighted rose 
was placed was not original and was not copyrighted.'l 
The arrangement of copyrighted roses against the non- . 
copyrighted background was examined for creativity justifying 
its own copyright.'2 The court held that because the symmet-
rical placement of the roses on the background was not 
designed to ease manufacture (the Feist "practical inevitabil-
ity" test) it was an artistic decision.43 The court determined 
that even though the pattern was one of only slight original-
ity and little creative output it was still copyrightable under 
Feist." 
The Feist "practical inevitability" test and creativity stan-
dard were applied to freestanding glass sculptures in Runs-
tadler Studios, Inc. v. MCM Ltd. Partnership,'" an action for 
copyright infringement. Defendants sought to show that the 
creativity of the copyrighted sculpture "Spiral Motion" was 
the fabric and showed it to a designer and asked for a similar design. The Byer's con-
tract designer created its own design, Byer purchased the fabric and sold thousands 
of garments using a similar design pattern. Folio obtained an injunction on stipula-
tion with Byer. Following a bench trial the district court held that the background 
of the original Folio rose design was non-copyrightable as in the public domain, and 
the pattern in which the roses were placed against the background was not original. 
The district court held that Folio did have a valid copyright to the rose itself, but con-
cluded that there had been no infringement. The injunction was lifted, judgment 
entered and Folio appealed. rd. at 762. 
40. rd. at 763. Because Folio had a certificate of copyright registration for the 
rose and defendants offered no proof to rebut the attendant presumption of validity, 
Folio was entitled to copyright protection for the rose as a matter oflaw. rd. 
41. rd. at 763-64. Expert testimony showed that the source of the background 
was in the public domain and, contrary to the assertions of Folio, the background could 
not have been independently created in one day but must have been photocopied. rd. 
42. rd. at 765. The roses in the fabric pattern had been placed in straight lines 
and turned so that the roses faced in various directions. The pattern was created by 
"clip art," a design process where the designer had photocopied the rose, pasted them 
onto a background and photocopied the result. rd. at 764. 
43. rd. at 765. 
44. rd. The copyright extended only to the arrangement of the Folio rose in 
straight lines, not to the idea of arranging roses in straight lines. rd. at 764-65. 
45. 768 F. Supp. 1292 (N.D. Ill. 1991). In 1983 Runstadler Studio Inc. (Runstadler) 
produced "Spiral Motion," a SCUlpture composed of 39 clear glass rectangles, overly-
ing each other to produce an arc of 405 degrees. Run stadler was issued a certificate 
of copyright registration on ·Spiral Motion" in 1988. MCM Limited Partnership sold 
a similar sculpture created in 1986 by a co- defendant composed of 17 glass rectangles 
producing an arc of 360 degrees. Runstadler brought suit for copyright infringement 
and claims for deceptive trade practices under Illinois law. Following hearings the 
district court found that ·Spiral Motion" had been indirectly copied and Runstadler 
moved for permanent injunction. [d. at 1294-95. 
7
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insufficient to afford copyright protection which would preclude 
their liability for copyright infringement.48 
The district court turned to Feist to note that the creativ-
ity required for a valid copyright was extremely low.47 The 
court first held that "Spiral Motion's" shape and dimensions 
were made by choice, thereby passing the "practical inevitabil-
ity" test of Feist.48 The court then held that "Spiral Motion" pos-
sessed the required creativity to qualify as an original work of 
authorship because the choice of location, orientation and 
dimensions of the glass panes showed far more than the triv-
ial amount of creativity necessary.49 
The Feist "practical inevitability" test and creativity stan-
dard were applied to a set of plastic signs in Sem-Torq, Inc. v. 
K mart Corp.50 Sem-Torq brought an action for infringement 
against a competitor and sought to have the signs protected by 
copyright as a compilation.51 
The appellate court held that the choice of colors, legends, 
phrases and pairings of the individual Sem-Torq signs were 
mandated by the functional nature of the signs and not the 
result of creativity. 52 The signs did not pass the "practical 
inevitability" test of Feist. The court necessarily held that the 
individual signs were not copyrightable as devoid of even the 
slightest trace of creativity. 53 
46. [d. at 1295. 
47. [d. 
48. [d. at 1295-96. 
49. [d. at 1297. The denial of the defendant's copyright by the Copyright Office 
as an improper -idea" copyright was successfully used to defend the action as plain-
tiff could not copyright the -idea" either. Defendant's spiral was found expressive and 
visually different from -Spiral Motion" and therefore not an infringement ofplaintifrs 
copyright. [d. at 1298-99. 
50. 936 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1991). Sem-Torq developed five plastic double-sided 
signs to be sold as a -set.· Each had a different legend on each side such as -For Sale" 
backed with -For Rent." The legends were selected based on "seasonal, demograph-
ic, and geographic" factors. The sign "set" was displayed in a tiered rack, with each 
sign in an individual pocket. The Sem- Torq signs were sold separately. Co-defendant 
Hy-Ko developed its own double sided signs designed to fit in the existing racks 
after learning from K mart of successful test sales of the Sem-Torq signs. Hy-Ko used 
twelve preexisting legends and artwork from Hy-Ko signs already sold by Hy-Ko to 
K mart. Hy-Ko's -set" consisted of six signs on which were -logically" paired legends 
such as -House For Sale" backed with -For Sale by Owner.· Sem-Torq brought Buit 
against K mart and Hy-Ko for copyright infringement, and state law claims of unfair 
competition, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract. Summary judgment was 
granted in favor ofK mart and Hy-Ko. Sem-Torq appealed. 1d. at 852-53. 
51. [d. at 854. 
52. [d. 
53. [d. at 854-55. 
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The appellate court then held that because the signs were 
sold separately and not as a set, the signs did not constitute an 
original work of authorship as a compilation.54 
Each of the above cases reached the determination of copy-
rightability by first applying the "practical inevitability" test 
of Feist followed by the creativity assessment. In each case if 
the "practical inevitability" test were passed the constitution-
ally-mandated level of creativity existed and the non-func-
tional and original portions of the work were copyrightable. We 
now turn to a case where the exact opposite result was reached. 
The Feist creativity standard and the "practical inevitability" 
test were applied by the Copyright Office and the D.C. District 
Court to deny a copyright for lack of creativity in Homer Laughlin 
China Co., v. Oman.55 The suit reviewed the Copyright Office's 
denial of an application for copyright of a chinaware pattern.56 
Plaintiff filed under the Administrative Procedure Act57 
contending that the Copyright Office's refusal to register the 
chinaware pattern "Gothic" was improper. 58 The issue before 
the district court was whether the United States Register of 
Copyrights abused his discretion in denying plaintiff's appli-
cation to register a claim to copyright in the chinaware design 
pattern "Gothic." The district court held that the Register had 
not abused his discretion.59 
54. [d. at 855. 
55. 1991 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) , 26,772 (D.D.C. July 30, 1991). Plaintiff, 
Homer Laughlin, created "Gothic" as a china pattern in early January 1988, which 
enjoyed considerable commercial success. On April 15, 1988 plaintiff filed its initial 
application for copyright of "Gothic." The Copyright Office rejected the application 
because familiar shapes and symbols were not copyrightable nor were simple varia· 
tions or combinations of basic geometric designs capable of supporting a copyright reg-
istration. [d. 
Plaintiff refiled its application on February 13, 1989 and the Copyright Office 
again denied it on April 1, 1989 because "[tjhe work you submitted for copyright reg-
istration is a useful article ... [andj Congress stated that it did not intend to protect 
the designs of useful articles." [d. 
On September 29, 1989 plaintiff sought reconsideration but the rejection was 
affirmed on January 16, 1990 because "the authorship presented must be considered 
in its entirety ... [bjut overall authorship on each of these pieces of china is really a 
familiar china ware presentation which constitutes too minimal an amount of original 
creative authorship to meet even the low standard of authorship required for a work 
to be copyrighted." [d. 
The final action refusing to register the copyright came in a letter from the 
Register on November I, 1990. [d. 
56.1d. 
57. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988). 
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The court determined that in approving "Gothic" for copy-
right, the question for the Register was whether "Gothic" con-
tained certain levels of creativity and originality.60 The court 
held that the Copyright Office's incantation of the regulation 
barring registration of familiar designs was a shorthand 
method of expressing the conclusion that "Gothic" did not 
embody a sufficient degree of creative authorship.61 
The district court noted that Feist held the requisite level 
of creativity was extremely low, even a slight amount would suf-
fice. 62 Then without further comment or application of the 
Feist creativity standard, the district court held that it was not 
an abuse of discretion to deny the copyright.6s 
The district court's rationale was that the Register's refusal 
to copyright the chinaware design pattern "Gothic" was not 
final since Homer Laughlin could gain full judicial review of 
copyrightability in an infringement action." 
V. COPYRIGHT OFFICE REVIEW OF FUNCTIONAL 
OBJECTS 
Because chinaware is a useful article, we will now examine 
the statutory requirements for copyright registration of useful 
articles and observe that the "practical inevitability" test had 
been statutorily mandated for useful articles long before Feist. 
A useful article is one having an intrinsic utilitarian func-
tion that is not merely to portray the appearance of the arti-
cle or to convey information.66 The registration of useful 
60. 1d. at 24,507 (citing John Muller &: Co. v. New York Arrows Soccer Team, 802 
F.2d 989, 990 (8th Cir. 1986». 
61. 1d. at 24,508. 
62.1d. 
63. 1d. The second reference to creativity was in the third letter, where copyright 
was denied because -the authorship presented must be considered in its entirety 
... [bjut overall authorship on each of these pieces of china is really a familiar chi-
naware presentation which constitutes too minimal an amount of original creative 
authorship to meet even the low standard of authorship required for a work to be copy-
righted." 1d. 
64. 1d. Plaintiff had raised three contentions in its argument for reconsidera-
tion: first, that the Register had not clearly explained the basis for his refusal to reg-
ister -Gothic" on the basis of insufficient creative authorship; second, that the 
procedures for review of the chinaware pattern were deficient; and third, that the com-
mercial success, expense, human effort, professional skills and expertise of the 
designer and artistic recognition qualified -Gothic" for a copyright. 1d. The third argu-
ment is the -sweat of the brow" theory thoroughly discredited in Feist. 
65. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). 
10
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articles presents the Copyright Office with one of the most dif-
ficult issues arising under the Copyright Act.66 
Congress excluded the design of useful articles from the 
realm of copyright except when the design incorporates artis-
tic features that can be identified separately from and are 
capable of existing independently of the utilitarian aspects of 
the article. 67 This is the "practical inevitability" test as formu-
lated in Feist, which mandates that this test applies to all 
copyrights.68 
It was the intent of Congress that unless the shape of an 
automobile, airplane, ladies dress, food processor, or any other 
industrial product contains some element that, physically or 
conceptually, can be identified as separable from the utilitar-
ian aspects of the article, the design would not be copyrighted. 69 
In OddzOn Products, Inc. v. Oman, a case predating Feist, 
the Copyright Office affirmed that elements of an object that 
were inextricably interwoven with the utilitarian aspects of the 
article could not be taken into account in the creativity assess-
ment when it denied copyright for the "Koosh" ball.70 
The district court on review similarly indicated that it 
would have been arbitrary for the Copyright Office to deny reg-
istration because the "Koosh" ball's shape approximated a 
sphere.71 The court determined that it was not merely that the 
66. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (quoting 
Perlmutter, Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles, 
37 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y. 339 (1990». 
67. [d. 
68. Feist, 111 S. Ct. at 1297. 
69. OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 349 (citing H.R. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 55, reprint· 
ed in 1976 CODE CONGo & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5668). 
70. [d. at 348. OddzOn plaintiffs had invented the "Koosh- ball which is a 
patented, trademarked product formed of hundreds of floppy, wiggly, elastomeric fil· 
aments radiating from a core. The Copyright Office refused to register the ball as a 
soft sculpture. OddzOn had sought copyright registration for the "Koosh- ball to 
block importation ofless expensive knockoffs. [d. at 347-48. 
The Copyright Office addressed both the visual character and the "tactility- or 
feel of the "Koosh" ball. The examiners regarded the "Koosh- ball's shape as a famil· 
iar symbol or design because the ball's filaments, rudiment ally formed a sphere, 
and according to the Copyright Office, there was no copyrightable authorship in cre-
ating such a familiar shape. The texture of the object was perceived by the examin-
ers as a functional part of the work, and therefore not a foundation for registration. 
The examiner held "[w]e cannot register a claim for ... the way a work functions, 
because Congress did not authorize protection for the functional aspects of articles.-
[d. 
71. [d. at 348. 
11
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"Koosh" ball approximated a sphere, it was also that there was 
not enough additional creative work beyond the object's basic 
shape to warrant a copyright.72 The "Koosh" ball had only a sin-
gle basic shape, a sphere.73 In reviewing the district court's 
affirmance of denial of the copyright for the "Koosh" ball, the 
D.C. Circuit held that the position of the Copyright Office 
was clear and that the visual aspect of the "Koosh" ball (a 
single sphere) did not reflect the minimal degree of creativity 
required for a copyright.74 
However, Feist and all its progeny in infringement cases 
would require opposite results in both Oddzon and Homer 
Laughlin and grant copyright. The Copyright Office's denial of 
copyright after the determination that an object has passed the 
"practical inevitability" test conflicts with the Supreme Court's 
determination of constitutionally protected creativity enti-
tled to copyright in Feist. The conflict is caused by the stan-
dard of review applied by the courts to the denial of copyright 
by the Copyright Office for the lack of creativity. 
VI. THE DEFERENTIAL STANDARD OF REVIEW 
It is the practice of the Copyright Office to issue copyright 
registration under reservation and to resolve doubtful claims 
in favor ofregistration.76 When, after registration, the Register 
of Copyrights determines that the applicant has met the legal 
and formal requirements, the Copyright Office registers the 
claim and issues the applicant a certification of registration 
under the seal of the Copyright Office.76 
If the Copyright Office refuses registration, the applicant 
may seek immediate judicial review in an action under the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 77 
The Register is currently given a significant degree of def-
erence, and the Register's decision may be overturned only upon 
72. [d. 
73. [d. The district court applied the Copyright Act definition of "pictorial, 
graphic and sculptural works to the conceptual separability test in Brandir Int'l, Inc. 
v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1144 (2d Cir. 1987), and held it was not 
an abuse of discretion for the Copyright Office to rank the tactile qualities of the 
"Koosh" ball as dependent upon, and inseparable from, the utilitarian features of the 
object, and hence not protectable by copyright. [d. 
74. [d. at 349. 
75. Sem·Torq, Inc. v. K mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1991). 
76. 17 U.S.C. § 410 (1988). 
77. 5 U.S.C. § 701·706 (1988); 17 U.S.C. § 701(d) (1988). 
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an abuse of discretion standard.78 In its determination of 
abuse of discretion by the Register in denying a copyright, 
the reviewing court looks at the reasons stated in the final 
agency decision.79 The appellate stance in reviewing a refusal 
to register is the same as that for the district court, a defer-
ential abuse of discretion standard.8o 
The Copyright Office must explain if or why it was employ-
ing a categorical distinction of registrability thresholds for the 
contested work and other works.81 Feist casts this in grave doubt 
as the registrability threshold for all works is now the same. A 
work that passes the "practical inevitability" test is copyrightable. 
If the reviewing court is unable to discern from the final agen-
cy action disqualifying the application for registration how the 
register was applying the relevant statutory prescriptions the 
case must be returned for the requisite rational explanation.82 
It is the position of the D.C. District and D.C. Circuit 
Courts that the costs of forcing too fine an analysis and too 
extensive an explanation of a denial of registration are not 
worth the benefits, particularly when reviewing a question 
which has unavoidably subjective aspects such as how much 
creativity is sufficient to force the copyright office to register 
a proffered work.83 The Register's determination that a deposit-
ed object's visual aspect does not reflect the minimal degree of 
creativity required for copyright, adequately explains copyright 
denial and will not require reversal under the deferential 
abuse of standard of review. 84 
It is the current policy of the Copyright Office that famil-
iar symbols or designs are not subject to copyright.86 However, 
78. OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 348. 
79. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The failure 
of the district court in Homer Laughlin to restrict its decision to the final refusal let-
ter of the Register may constitute reversible error. See Homer Laughlin China Co. v. 
Oman, 1991 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) en 26,772, at 24,508 <D.D.C. July 30,1991). 
80. Atari, 888 F.2d at 881. 
81. OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 348. 
82. Atari, 888 F.2d at 881. See also Fort Bragg Ass'n. of Educators v. F.L.R.A., 
870 F.2d 698, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1989); City of Vernon v. FERC, 845 F.2d 1042, 1046-49 
(D.C. Cir. 1988). 
83. Atari, 888 F.2d at 887 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
84. OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 347-48. In OddzOn, the court tacitly held that the only 
suitable forum for determination of conceptual separability (i.e. the "practical 
inevitabilityW test) was in an action for copyright infringement. Id. at 347. 
85. 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1991). In Homer Laughlin, the Copyright Office made two 
references to the level of creativity found in plaintiffs china ware pattern. The appli-
13
Hart: Feist Test
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1992
562 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:549 
simple shapes when selected or combined in a distinctive man-
ner indicating some ingenuity have been accorded copyright.B6 
Notwithstanding the Copyright Office's assertions in Homer 
Laughlin to the contrary, unique combinations of standard 
shapes may be copyrighted.B7 Copyright is intended to encour-
age original work.88 It does not mean that relatively simple 
works are not entitled copyright protection. 89 Component 
parts neither original to the applicant nor copyrightable may, 
in combination, create a separate entity that is both original 
and copyrightable.eo 
In determining creativity, the Register is generally recog-
nized to possess considerable expertise over such matters as a 
result of having to make such determinations on a daily basis, 
and such a determination required the exercise of informed 
discretion.91 
The Copyright Office is not held to be arbitrary by adher-
ing to the conceptual separability test of the Second Circuit 
(now supplanted by the "practical inevitability" test of Feist).92 
However, the question of conceptual separability ("practical 
inevitability") does not come under the purview of the court 
when reviewing the denial of registration of copyrights.93 
Another ground for deference to the Copyright Office's 
denial of copyright for lack of creativity is that determination 
of copyrightability may be sought in an infringement action. 9• 
cation was first denied because familiar shapes are not copyrightable nor are simple 
variations or combinations of basic geometric designs capable of supporting a copy-
right registration. Homer Laughlin, 1991 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) .. 26,772. 
86. See, e.g., Soptra Fabrics, Corp. v. Stafford Knitting Mills, Inc., 490 F.2d 1092, 
1094 (2d Cir. 1974) (fabric design with strip of crescents with scalloping or ribbons with 
rows of semicircles); Concord Fabrics, Inc. v. Marcus Bros. Textile Corp., 409 F.2d 1315, 
1316 (2d Cir. 1969) (fabric design of circle within a square within a circle). 
87. Runstadler Studios, Inc. v. MCM Ltd. Partnership, 768 F. Supp. 1292, 1295 
(1991). 
88. See id. 
89. See id. 
90. See Apple Barrel Prod., Inc. v. Beard, 730 F.2d 384, 388 (5th Cir. 1984). See 
also Folio Impressions, Inc. v. Byer Cal., 937 F.2d 759, 764-65 (2d Cir. 1991). 
91. Norris Indus., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918, 922 
(11th Cir. 1983). 
92. OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 350 (D.C. Cir. 1991). See also 
Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987), for a dis-
cussion of this test. 
93. OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 349. 
94. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 880 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
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The determination on review that the Copyright Office's denial 
is not an abuse of discretion, does not dictate the outcome if the 
same question were brought in a copyright infringement 
action.96 
In an infringement action, the court need not defer to an 
agency's action or interpretation." However, in at least one 
recent decision a district court held that to sustain a suit for 
copyright infringement the item must be registered in accor-
dance with the Copyright Act.·? 
A district court is not required to accept validity of copyright 
registration where the certificate of registration was not made 
until five years after first publication of the work.98 A copyright 
certificate remains valid in the absence offraud.99 
In a trademark infringement action, the refusal to admit evi-
dence that a manufacturer attempted but failed to have a design 
registered under the Copyright Act is not an abuse of discretion. 100 
The position ofthe Copyright Office and the courts that get-
ting a copyright later is just as good as getting one sooner is 
untenable. The existence of a valid copyright does have effect 
on an infringement action. 
In copyright infringement cases, because firsthand evi-
dence of copying often is unobtainable, copying may be inferred 
where defendant had access to copyrighted material and the 
assertedly infringing work is substantially alike. lol Registration 
might have evidentiary impact in an action against an infringer 
and would prevent the Register's appearance at the infringe-
ment action as a party hostile to the claimant on the issue of 
registrability.lo2 Another important aspect of prior copyright 
protection is the availability of preliminary injunction to a copy-
right holder in an infringement action. lOS 
95. OddzOn, 924 F.2d at 350. 
96. Atari, 888 F.2d at 889 (Silberman, J., concurring). 
97. Bauer Lamp Co. v. ShatTer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1171 (11th Cir. 1991). 
98. Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851, 853-54 (6th Cir. 1991). 
99. Bauer, 941 F.2d at 1171. 
100. ld. 
101. Store Decor v. Stylex Worldwide Indus., Ltd., 767 F. Supp. 181, 184 (N.D. 
Ill. 1991). 
102. Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878, 881. 
103. Lakedreams v. Taylor, 932 F.2d 1103, 1107 (5th Cir. 1991). To obtain a 
preliminary injunction in a copyright infringement suit the moving party must show 
15
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A copyright may be valuable outside of its evidentiary pre-
sumption in an infringement action. Copyright owners may 
request the customs service to seize infringing copies. 104 Anoth-
er reason is that the advantages, requirements, and protections 
of copyright differ from trademark. lo5 The property of a bank-
ruptcy estate encompasses intellectual property, such as inter-
ests in copyrights. 106 
VII. FEIST MANDATES CHANGE IN THE STANDARD OF 
REVIEW OF COPYRIGHT DENIALS 
The minimal creativity standard of Feist raises a funda-
mental problem: Is denial of copyright by the Copyright Office 
to functional objects for insufficient creativity after passing the 
"practical inevitability" test an abuse of discretion? 
In all works, including functional objects, non-copyrightable 
elements exist. Prior to Feist the level of creativity necessary 
for copyright protection had been described as "very slight," 
"minimal" or "modest." After Feist, a work must be devoid of 
even the slightest trace of creativity to be denied copyright. The 
courts must apply the "practical inevitability" test. Copyright 
can be denied only when form follows function. The method of 
measuring for originality may vary but the standard remains 
the same for every copyright. 
"(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) a substantial threat that fail-
ure to grant the injunction will result in irreparable injury, (3) the threatened injury 
outweighs any damage that the injunction may cause the opposing party, and (4) the 
injunction will not disserve the public interest." [d. (quoting Allied Mktg. Group, Inc. 
v. CDL Mktg., Inc., 878 F.2d 806, 809 (5th Cir. 1989». The evidentiary weight of a 
copyright certificate may be compelling in the success on the merits issue. [d. 
104. 19 C.F.R. § 133.31 (1991). The procedures to stop importation of articles that 
infringe a valid and enforceable United States Patent before the U.S. International 
Trade Commission are more cumbersome. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (aXb)(1) (1988). Only copy-
right claims which have been registered may be recorded with customs for import pro-
tection. 19 C.F.R. § 133.31. A classic example of the desirability of this advantage is 
found in OddzOn Prods., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Copyright 
Office refused to register the "Koosh" ball as a soft sculpture. OddzOn had a trade-
mark and a patent on the "Koosh" ball but sought copyright registration to block 
importation ofless expensive knockoffs. [d. 
105. See Esercizio v. Roberts, 944 F.2d 1235, 1238-39 (6th Cir. 1991). The 
"trade dress" protected from infringement by the Lanham Trademark Act is the 
image and overall appearance ofa product and embodies that arrangement ofiden-
tifying characteristics or decorations connected with a product, whether by packag-
ing or otherwise, intended to make source of product distinguishable from another and 
to promote its sale. [d. 
106. Inslaw v. United States, 932 F.2d 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Trademark pro-
tection accrues with use, while copyright protection begins with registration. Bauer 
Lamp CO. V. Shaffer, 941 F.2d 1165, 1171 (11th Cir. 1991). 
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The Supreme Court's adoption in Feist of a "practical 
inevitability" test of the threshold which a work must exceed 
to achieve copyright as creative necessitates that any functional 
object which can meet the current statutory requirements 
that its creative visual elements be separable from its utili-
tarian aspects is ipso facto copyrightable. 
A faithful application of the Feist standard would require 
certification by the Register of Copyright of all useful articles 
that can show visual elements not related to their function. Any 
higher standard that Copyright Office requires for useful 
objects to attain copyright is directly contrary to the Supreme 
Court's holding in Feist that the constitutionally mandated 
standard requires protection for any expression beyond "prac-
tical inevitability." 
The contrary result is achieved by an unjustified deferen-
tial standard of review by the D.C. District and Circuit Courts. 
The Register's creativity determinations are erroneously held 
to require considerable expertise and require the exercise of in-
formed discretion. Because the Feist mandated creativity 
standard is so low, experts are not necessary to make the cre-
ativity determination and there is no need for the reviewing 
court's deference. 
If there are visual elements in a functional object's design 
not based on practical considerations, copyright is both justi-
fied and mandatory. If non-practical visual elements exist 
then they are creative. If they are creative then they pass 
constitutional muster. It is no longer proper for a reviewing 
court to defer to the Register's determination on creativity 
after the initial determination that non-practical visual ele-
ments exist. Denial of copyright subsequent to this determi-
nation is an abuse of discretion. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The denial of copyright until the instigation of an in-
fringement suit after determining the work meets the "practi-
cal inevitability" test is an interference with property, 
procedural, and evidentiary rights. The outcome in the suc-
ceeding infringement action can only be that the work is cre-
ative and entitled to copyright. 
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The reviewing courts should strictly adhere to Feist and 
overturn as an abuse of discretion all denials of copyright by 
the Copyright Office after the determination that elements 
which pass the "practical inevitability" test exist. 
Joseph P. Hart 101 
107. Golden Gate University School of Law, class of 1994. 
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